# 1NC

### FW

#### A.) Interpretation – the affirmative has to defend the normative desirability of the United States federal government action as part of their advocacy

#### Should means the aff has to defend the USFG is obliged to act

AskDefine.com ‘11

AskDefine, Online dictionary, should.askdefine.com

The speaker but not necessarily the [subject](http://subject.askdefine.com/) of the sentence [intend](http://intend.askdefine.com/)s for the subject to execute the sentence [predicate](http://predicate.askdefine.com/).

#### And, the United States federal government is the central government in Washington

#### WEST'S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY, 1985

p. 744. (MHHAR7000)

United States: Usually means the federal government centered in Washington, D.C.

#### B.) Violation – the aff does not declare the desirability of the US government executing the resolution in the present

#### C.) Standards

#### Limits – they’re ability to pass a policy at any moment of time means that none of our arguments apply – any of our agency CP’s, politics DA’s, core generics like natural gas DA’s no longer work as agencies have different core functions and the energy and political context has changed – makes clash impossible which produces un-education shoddy debates

#### Extra-topicality – they open the can of worms to have any type of aff with a qualifier – their advocacy statement begins with “We thus advocate the following counterfactual plan:” – This allows for affs that say “we advocate the following ironic plan:” – this multiplies the topic by hundreds, makes it impossible for us to predict their advocacy and to get any offense – that reduces debate to trading back and forth of generalities where the aff always wins because they know what is going on

#### Bidirectional- allowing “relationships” to the topic to be sufficient lets the aff invert the topic and claim the neg should be prepared. This magnifies the neg’s research burden and turns all generics into aff advantages, making it virtually impossible to be neg.

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 09, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Counter-factuals destroy our decision-making skill because we’re never forced to think about what we should do in the present – it is important to include historical analysis when we make decisions but not to rely entirely on historical situations – no 2 situations are analysis – oil price spikes in the late 70’s made the energy situation entirely different from the current energy climate of a glut of natural gas

#### Topicality is a gateway issue- impact turns beg the question of our ability to prepare adequately and competing interpretations is the best way to evaluate topicality because it preserves the form of clash, and is the only way to resolve our impacts above

### K

#### Consumption practices ensure extinction – cause overshoot and collapse of the environment, only re-organizing society can solve

Smith 11

(Gar, Editor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal, “NUCLEAR¶ ROULETTE¶ THE CASE AGAINST A¶ “NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE” Pgs. 46)

Even if all of the world’s current energy output could be produced by renewables, this level of¶ energy consumption would still inflict terrible harm on Earth’s damaged ecosystems. In order to¶ survive, we need to relearn how to use less. It is critical that we adopt a Conservation Imperative.¶ Faced with the inevitable disappearance of the stockpiles of cheap energy we have used to move and¶ transform matter, we need to identify society’s fundamental needs and invest our limited energy resources¶ in those key areas. A Post-Oil/Post Coal/Post-Nuclear world can no longer sustain the one-time extravagances¶ of luxury goods, designed-to-be-disposable products, and brain-numbing entertainment devices.¶ The long-distance transport of raw materials, food and manufactured goods will need to decline in favor¶ of local production geared to match local resources and needs. Warfare—the most capital-, resource- and¶ pollution-intensive human activity—must also be diminished. Neither the costly inventory of nuclear¶ arms nor the Pentagon’s imperial network of 700-plus foreign bases is sustainable. There will doubtless¶ still be wars but, in the Post-oil World, they will be either be waged with solar-powered tanks or fought¶ on horseback.¶ Modern economies insist on powering ahead like competing steamboats in an upstream race. We have¶ become addicted to over-consumption on a planet that was not designed for limitless exploitation. As¶ the late environmental leader David Brower noted: “In the years since the Industrial Revolution, we¶ humans have been partying pretty hard. We’ve ransacked most of the Earth for resources….We are living¶ off the natural capital of the planet—the principal, and not the interest. The soil, the seas, the forests, the¶ rivers, and the protective atmospheric cover—all are being depleted. It was a grand binge, but the hangover¶ is now upon us, and it will soon be throbbing.” 224¶ On the eve of India’s independence, Mahatma Gandhi was asked whether his new nation could expect¶ to attain Britain’s level of industrial development. Noting that “it took Britain half the resources of this¶ planet to achieve its prosperity,” Gandhi famously estimated that raising the rest of the world to British¶ levels of consumption would require “two more planets.” The United Nations Development Program¶ recently reconsidered Gandhi’s equation as it applies towards “a world edging towards the brink of¶ dangerous climate change.”¶ Working from the assumed “sustainable” ceiling of climate-warming gases (14.5 Gt CO2 per year),¶ UNEP confirmed that “if emissions were frozen at the current level of 29 Gt CO2, we would need two¶ planets.” Unfortunately, UNEP noted, some countries are producing more CO2 than others. Fifteen¶ percent of the world’s richest residents are using 90 percent of the planet’s sustainable budget of shared¶ resources. According to UNEP’s calculations, just sustaining the current lifestyle of Canada and the U.S.¶ would require the resources of 16 planets—eight planets each. 225

#### **Renewables reproduce neoliberal social relations – they’re driven by a desire to maintain status quo consumption, and emanate from profit-motivated corporations**

Byrne & Toly 6

(Josh, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy and distinguished professor of energy and climate policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Politics & International Relations, Director of Urban Studies Program at Wheaton, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, pgs. 1-32 in Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict, eds. Josh Byrne, Noah Toly, and Leigh Glover)

Where the power to govern is not vested in experts, it is given over to market forces in both the conventional and sustainable energy programs. Just as the transitions envisioned in the two paradigms are alike in their technical preoccupations and governance ideologies, they are also alike in their political- economic commitments. Specifically, modernist energy transitions operate in, and evolve from, a capitalist political economy. Huber and Mills (2005) are convinced that conventional techno-fixes will expand productivity and increase prosperity to levels that will erase the current distortions of inequality. Expectably, conventional energy’s aspirations present little threat to the current energy political economy; indeed, the aim is to reinforce and deepen the current infrastructure in order to minimize costs and sustain economic growth. The existing alliance of government and business interests is judged to have produced social success and, with a few environmental correctives that amount to the modernization of ecosystem performance, the conventional energy project fervently anticipates an intact energy capitalism that willingly invests in its own perpetuation. While advocates of sustainable energy openly doubt the viability of the conventional program and emphasize its social and environmental failings, there is little indication that capitalist organization of the energy system is faulted or would be significantly changed with the ascendance of a renewablesbased regime. The modern cornucopia will be powered by the profits of a redirected market economy that diffuses technologies whose energy sources are available to all and are found everywhere. The sustainable energy project, according to its architects, aims to harness nature’s ‘services’ with technologies and distributed generation designs that can sustain the same impulses of growth and consumption that underpin the social project of conventional energy. Neither its corporate character, nor the class interests that propel capitalism’s advance, are seriously questioned. The only glaring difference with the conventional energy regime is the effort to modernize social relations with nature. In sum, conventional and sustainable energy strategies are mostly quiet about matters of concentration of wealth and privilege that are the legacy of energy capitalism, although both are vocal about support for changes consistent with middle class values and lifestyles. We are left to wonder why such steadfast reluctance exists to engaging problems of political economy. Does it stem from a lack of understanding? Is it reflective of a measure of satisfaction with the existing order? Or is there a fear that critical inquiry might jeopardize strategic victories or diminish the central role of ‘energy’ in the movement’s quest?

Our alternative is to reject the politics of technological production

Rather than focusing on production of technology, we should embrace our ability to shape and transform our subjectivity as consumers, embracing voluntary simplicity – this debate offers a crucial moment to produce alternative knowledge about everyday living practices

Alexander ‘11

(Samuel, University of Melbourne; Office for Environmental Programs/Simplicity Institute, “

Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence”, Social Sciences Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1941087)

The aim of this paper, however, is not to present a thorough analysis of Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of existence. Several such analyses have appeared in recent times (after years of unfortunate scholarly neglect), and much of this emerging commentary is very probing and insightful.12 But this is not the time to focus on furthering that critical discussion or even providing a comprehensive literature review of it. Instead, after providing a brief exposition of Foucault’s ethics, this paper will undertake to actually apply the idea of an aesthetics of existence to a particular subject of ethical concern, namely, to our role as ‘consumers’ in the context of First World overconsumption. This is an area that raises ethical questions concerning how we ought to live for two main reasons: firstly, due to the impact Western--‐style consumers are having on the natural environment; and secondly, due to the continued existence of poverty amidst plenty. There is, however, another perspective to consider also. A large body of sociological and psychological literature now exists indicating that Western--‐style consumption practices are often failing to provide meaning and fulfillment, even to those who have ‘succeeded’ in attaining a high material standard of living.13 These three consumption--‐related issues – ecological degradation, poverty amidst plenty, and consumer malaise – provide ample grounds for thinking that consumption is a proper subject for ethical engagement, in the Foucauldian sense of ethics as ‘the self enfgaging the self.’ If it is the case that our individual identities have been shaped, insidiously perhaps, by a social system that celebrates and encourages consumption without apparent limit – and it would not be unfair to describe consumer societies in these terms14 – then it may be that ethical practice today calls for a rethinking of our assumptions and attitudes concerning consumption, which might involve a deliberate reshaping of the self by the self. This paper will explore the possibility of such an ethics of consumption in the following ways. First, by explaining how neoclassical economics, which is arguably the most influential paradigm of thought in the world today, conceptualizes consumption as something that benefits both ‘self’ and ‘other’ and, therefore, as something that should be maximized. To the extent that modern consumers have internalized this conception of consumption, an ethics of consumption might involve engaging the self for the purpose of changing the self and creating something new. The second way an ethics of consumption will be explored will be through an examination of the theory and practice of ‘voluntary simplicity,’ a term that refers to an oppositional living strategy or ‘way of life’ with which people, somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, seek an increased quality of life through a reduction and restraint of one’s level of consumption.15 The paradox, so-­‐ called, consists in the attempt to live ‘more with less.’ Since voluntarily living simply means heading in the opposite direction to where most people in consumer societies (and increasingly elsewhere) seem to want to go, one would expect living simply to require a fundamentally creative engagement with life and culture, especially in contemporary consumer societies that seem to be predicated on the assumption that ‘more consumption is always better.’ This need for a fundamentally creative engagement with life is what prompted the present attempt to elucidate the idea of ‘voluntary simplicity as aesthetics of existence,’ and it is this attempt to infuse Foucauldian ethics with an emerging post-­‐consumerist philosophy of life that constitutes the original contribution of this paper. It is hoped that this practical application of Foucault’s ethics might also prompt others to consider how ethical engagement might produce new ways of being that are freer, more fulfilling, and yet less resource-­‐intensive and damaging than the modes of being which are dominant in consumer societies today. Could it be, for example, that the ‘Death of Man,’ to use Foucault’s phrase, was actually the first (and a necessary) phase in the demise of what one might call ‘homo consumicus’? And what forms of life, what modes of being, would or could materialize with the voluntary emergence of ‘homo post-­‐consumicus’? These are the large questions that motivated this study and in the following pages a preliminary attempt is made to grapple with them. The aim, however, is not to legitimate ‘what is already known,’16 since that would not be a very Foucauldian endeavor; rather, the aim is to explore whether or to what extent it is possible to ‘free thought from what it silently thinks,’17 in the hope that this might open up space to ‘think differently,’18 to think otherwise.

#### **Solar energy mystifies existing consumption practices, greening them to remove guilt for our unsustainable ecological footprint**

Byrne & Toly 6

(Josh, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy and distinguished professor of energy and climate policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Politics & International Relations, Director of Urban Studies Program at Wheaton, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, pgs. 1-32 in Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict, eds. Josh Byrne, Noah Toly, and Leigh Glover)

In this regard, ironically, Small-is-Beautiful Solar shares with Big Wind the aspiration to re-order the energy regime without changing society. Despite modern society’s technological, economic, and political addiction to large-scale, cheap energy systems that solar energy cannot mimic, most PV proponents hope to revolutionize the technological foundation of modernity, without disturbing its social base. A new professional cadre of solar architects and engineers are exhorted to find innovative ways of embedding PV technology in the skin of buildings (Strong, 1999; Benemann, Chehab, and Schaar-Gabriel, 2001), while transportation engineers and urban planners are to coordinate in launching “smart growth” communities where vehicles are powered by hydrogen derived from PV-powered electrolysis to move about in communities optimized for “location efficiency” (Ogden, 1999; Holtzclaw et al., 2002). The wildly oversized ecological footprint of urban societies (Rees and Wackernagel, 1996) is unquestioned as PV decorates its structure. These tools for erecting a Solar Society intend to halt anthropogenic changes to the chemistry of the atmosphere, rain, and soil mantle while enabling unlimited economic growth. In the Solar Society of tomorrow, we will make what we want, in the amounts we desire, without worry, because all of its energy is derived from the benign, renewable radiation supplied by our galaxy’s sun. Compared to Big Wind, PV may cost more but it promises to deliver an equivalent social result (minus the avian and landscape threats of the former) and, just possibly, with a technical elegance that surpasses the clunky mechanicalness of turbines propelled by wind. In this respect, Solar Society makes its peace with modernity by leaving undisturbed the latter’s cornucopian dreams19 and, likewise, poses no serious challenge to the social and political structures of the modern era. At this precise point, inequality and conflict can only be conceived in Solar Society as the results of willful meanness and greed. While the solar variety of technological politics guiding society may be relatively minimalist—no towering new monuments or spectacular devices are planned—it would be no less committed to the ideals of technique in shaping social experience and its self-assessment. Similarly, its economics would warmly embrace a form of consumptive capitalism, although with cleaner inputs (and possibly throughputs) than before. While the discussion here of sustainable energy advocacy has concentrated on its wind- and solar-animated versions, we believe that strategies anticipating significant roles for geothermal, biomass, micro-hydro, and hydrogen harvested from factories fueled by renewables anticipate variants of the social narratives depicted for the two currently most prominent renewable energy options. The aim of producing more with advancing ecological efficiency in order to consume more with equally advancing consumerist satisfaction underpins the sustainable energy future in a way that would seamlessly tie it to the modernization project.20

### CP

#### Text: The 113th Congress of the United States federal government should increase financial incentives for solar power through full funding of the Solar Bank.

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is a top priority --- Obama will make an aggressive push to get it passed

Volsky, 12/30 (Igor, 12/30/2012, “Obama To Introduce Immigration Reform Bill In 2013,” <http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/12/30/1379841/obama-to-introduce-immigration-reform-bill-in-2013/>)

President Obama reiterated his call for comprehensive immigration reform during an interview on Meet The Press, claiming that the effort will be a top goal in his second term. “Fixing our broken immigration is a top priority. I will introduce legislation in the first year to get that done,” Obama said. Administration officials have hinted that Obama will “begin an all-out drive for comprehensive immigration reform, including seeking a path to citizenship” for 11 million undocumented immigrants, after Congress addresses the fiscal cliff. The Obama administration’s “social media blitz” will start in January and is expected “to tap the same organizations and unions that helped get a record number of Latino voters to reelect the president.” Cabinet secretaries and lawmakers from both parties are already holding initial meetings to iron out the details of the proposal and Obama will to push for a broad bill.

#### Obama’s capital and bipartisan cooperation are key to effective reform

DMN, 1/2 (Dallas Morning News, “Editorial: Actions must match Obama’s immigration pledge,” 1/2/2013, <http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130102-editorial-actions-must-match-obamas-immigration-pledge.ece>)

President Barack Obama said all the right things Sunday about immigration reform. The president told NBC’s Meet the Press that he is serious about getting Congress to overhaul the laws governing immigrants. He even declared that he will introduce an immigration bill this year. This newspaper welcomes that announcement. Texans particularly understand the unique challenges that an outdated immigration system presents. Even though the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. has subsided in the last few years, the many holes in the system leave families, schools, businesses and law enforcement struggling. And those are just some of the constituents challenged by flawed immigration laws. The president’s words to NBC’s David Gregory are only that — words. What will really matter is whether he puts his muscle into the task this year. We suggest that Obama start by looking at the example of former President George W. Bush. Back in 2006 and 2007, the Republican and his administration constantly worked Capitol Hill to pass a comprehensive plan. They failed, largely because Senate Republicans balked. But the opposition didn’t stop the Bush White House from fully engaging Congress, including recalcitrant Republicans. Obama may have a similar problem with his own party. The dirty little secret in the 2006 and 2007 immigration battles was that some Democrats were content to let Senate Republicans kill the effort. Labor-friendly Democrats didn’t want a bill, either. And they may not want one this year. That reluctance is a major reason the president needs to invest in this fight. He must figure out how to bring enough Democrats along, while also reaching out to Republicans. In short, the nation doesn’t need a repeat of the process through which the 2010 health care legislation was passed. Very few Republicans bought into the president’s plan, leaving the Affordable Care Act open to partisan sniping throughout last year’s election. If the nation is going to create a saner immigration system, both parties need to support substantial parts of an answer. The new system must include a guest worker program for future immigrants and a way for illegal immigrants already living here to legalize their status over time. Some House Republicans will object to one or both of those reforms, so Speaker John Boehner must be persuasive about the need for a wholesale change. But the leadership that matters most will come from the White House. The president has staked out the right position. Now he needs to present a bill and fight this year for a comprehensive solution. Nothing but action will count.

#### Increasing energy incentives is contentious in the current climate

Hargreaves, 11/13 (Steve, 11/13/2012, “Why Obama's win won't help renewable energy,” <http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/13/news/economy/renewable-energy-obama/>)

Barack Obama's re-election may have seemed like a sure win for solar and wind power, given the President's history of supporting green energy. But the optimism quickly darkened in the aftermath. In the days following the election, renewable energy stocks fell, along with the broader market. The future isn't looking much brighter. Powerful forces are aligned against the renewable energy industries, that are likely to hold growth back. Worldwide, Bloomberg New Energy Finance is expecting to see a 12% decline in the growth rate for wind power in 2013 and an 8% decline in solar's growth, using conservative estimates. Government support: In the United States, one of the largest hurdles facing the industry is the expiration of years of government support that was seriously boosted by Obama's $787 billion stimulus program. Multi-billion dollar grants and loan guarantees that were part of the stimulus -- like the one that supported the now bankrupt Solyndra -- are basically over. Even tax credits that the industry has relied on for years -- which cover about 30% of a wind or solar projects' cost -- are no longer a sure thing. The wind industry's tax credit is set to expire at the end of this year. Analysts believe retaining tax credits for any type of energy will be a hard fight during upcoming negotiations over the federal budget and fiscal cliff. "Even if that battle is won, it is very unlikely that you will see an increase in support," said Sarah Ladislaw, an energy analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It's like an all-out battle for the status quo." Generous subsidies are also being phased out in Europe as deficits become a mounting problem.

#### Reform is key to U.S. competitiveness

Bush, McLarty & Alden, 09 – co-chairmen and director of a Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S. Immigration Policy (7/21/09, Former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush and former White House Chief of Staff Thomas F. McLarty and Edward Alden, “Nation needs comprehensive, flexible immigration reform,” http://www.ajc.com/opinion/nation-needs-comprehensive-flexible-97393.html)

Our immigration system has been broken for too long, and the costs of that failure are growing. Getting immigration policy right is fundamental to our national interests — our economic vitality, our diplomacy and our national security. In the report of the bipartisan Council on Foreign Relations’ Independent Task Force on U.S. Immigration Policy, we lay out what is at stake for the United States. President Barack Obama has made it clear that reform is one of his top priorities, and that is an encouraging and welcome signal. Immigration has long been America’s secret weapon. The U.S. has attracted an inordinate share of talented and hardworking immigrants who are enticed here by the world’s best universities, the most innovative companies, a vibrant labor market and a welcoming culture. Many leaders in allied nations were educated in the U.S., a diplomatic asset that no other country can match. And the contributions of immigrants — 40 percent of the science and engineering Ph.D.s in the U.S. are foreign-born, for example — have helped maintain the scientific and technological leadership that is the foundation of our national security. But the U.S. has been making life much tougher for many immigrants. Long processing delays and arbitrary quota backlogs keep out many would-be immigrants, or leave them in an uncertain temporary status for years. Background and other security checks are taking far too long in many cases. Other countries are taking advantage of these mistakes, competing for immigrants by opening their universities to foreign students and providing a faster track to permanent residency and citizenship.

#### Economic competition spills over into military competition – leads to racism and makes war inevitable

Saito ‘97

(Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law) (Natsu Taylor, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 Or. L. Rev. 261, LN)

The model minority myth has also created a paper tiger, or false threat. [n272](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285642312580&returnToKey=20_T10212824242&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.47700.828770783744#n272) The perception of Asians-as-enemy is never far from popular consciousness: from precipitating the breakup of the Beatles to bringing the U.S. auto industry to the brink of disaster to "sneak attacks" on the Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich's mother to perpetuating revisionist history (gasp) by suggesting that the 25th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be something less than an unalloyed moment of joyous patriotism. [n273](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285642312580&returnToKey=20_T10212824242&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.47700.828770783744#n273) One pervasive theme in this "enemy" imagery is the conflation of economic competition and military threat. Today's yellow peril appears "in the threat of 'Japan, Inc.,' the so-called 'Pacific Century,' and the rise of the East and the decline of the West." [n274](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285642312580&returnToKey=20_T10212824242&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.47700.828770783744#n274) The danger in creating such a paper tiger is not simply that Asian Americans are, as a result, the target of hostility and resentment. They also become a target upon whom racial and economic tensions can be vented without any real changes being made to underlying racial and economic relationships. Kathryn Imahara has described this process: This country depends on immigrant labor to pick the produce in the fields, work long hours for little pay in sewing factories, wash dirty laundry, care for children, clean homes and hotel  [\*315]  rooms, wash dishes in restaurants, and tend gardens. But when the economy goes into a recession, government leaders prefer to see immigrants, most of whom are at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder, fight amongst themselves for the lowest of jobs because scrutiny is shifted away from inept and racist government policies. [n275](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285642312580&returnToKey=20_T10212824242&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.47700.828770783744#n275) Thus, this paper tiger distracts attention from more fundamental problems in our legal, economic, and social structure. Asian Americans have been effectively raced as foreign. This allows them to be used as cheap and disposable labor, turned into an instant enemy, whether economic or military, and held up as a model minority in a way that masks real issues of discrimination and violence and pits Asian Americans against other minorities. These phenomena, in turn, help maintain the racial hierarchy and economic stratification that exist in the United States.

### Case

#### The plan is still a top down technocratic policy – just passes the solar bank instead of rejecting it – links to its own offense – they misunderstand what technological determinism is

#### Expanding renewables will require more fossil fuels to ensure effective back up power

Vartabedian, 12/9 (Ralph, 12/9/2012, “Rise in renewable energy will require more use of fossil fuels,” http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-unreliable-power-20121210,0,6250142.story)

The Delta Energy Center, a power plant about an hour outside San Francisco, was roaring at nearly full bore one day last month, its four gas and steam turbines churning out 880 megawatts of electricity to the California grid.

On the horizon, across an industrial shipping channel on the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, scores of wind turbines stood dead still. The air was too calm to turn their blades — or many others across the state that day. Wind provided just 33 megawatts of power statewide in the midafternoon, less than 1% of the potential from wind farms capable of producing 4,000 megawatts of electricity. As is true on many days in California when multibillion-dollar investments in wind and solar energy plants are thwarted by the weather, the void was filled by gas-fired plants like the Delta Energy Center. One of the hidden costs of solar and wind power — and a problem the state is not yet prepared to meet — is that wind and solar energy must be backed up by other sources, typically gas-fired generators. As more solar and wind energy generators come online, fulfilling a legal mandate to produce one-third of California's electricity by 2020, the demand will rise for more backup power from fossil fuel plants. "The public hears solar is free, wind is free," said Mitchell Weinberg, director of strategic development for Calpine Corp., which owns Delta Energy Center. "But it is a lot more complicated than that." Wind and solar energy are called intermittent sources, because the power they produce can suddenly disappear when a cloud bank moves across the Mojave Desert or wind stops blowing through the Tehachapi Mountains. In just half an hour, a thousand megawatts of electricity — the output of a nuclear reactor — can disappear and threaten stability of the grid. To avoid that calamity, fossil fuel plants have to be ready to generate electricity in mere seconds. That requires turbines to be hot and spinning, but not producing much electricity until complex data networks detect a sudden drop in the output of renewables. Then, computerized switches are thrown and the turbines roar to life, delivering power just in time to avoid potential blackouts. The state's electricity system can handle the fluctuations from existing renewable output, but by 2020 vast wind and solar complexes will sprawl across the state, and the problem will become more severe. Just how much added capacity will be needed from traditional sources is the subject of heated debate by utility officials, government regulators and policy experts. The concerns are expected to come to a head next year when the state must adopt a 10-year plan for its energy needs. "This issue is someplace between a significant concern and a major problem," said electricity system expert Severin Borenstein, a professor at UC Berkeley's Haas School of Business. "There is definitely going to be a need for more reserves." Borenstein said state legislators and the governor did not consider all of the details, such as unleashing this new demand for fossil fuel generators, when they set the 33% mandate for renewable energy. The state now gets 20% of its power from renewables, in part from older hydro and geothermal energy. Gov. Jerry Brown has advocated upping the goal to 40%. The cost to consumers in the years ahead could be in the billions of dollars, according to industry experts. California's electricity prices are already among the highest in the nation and are projected to rise sharply in coming years. At the moment, the need for reserve power isn't considered a cost of renewable power, though consumers have to bear its costs as well. The California Independent System Operator, the nonprofit company that runs the grid, estimates that by 2020 the state will need to double its reserve capacity. California now maintains a margin of 7% to 8% above projected daily demand, in case a nuclear power plant goes offline or outages occur. But when 33% of the state's power comes from renewables, that margin will have to rise to 15%, said Stephen Berberich, the firm's chief executive. Nobody knows whether Berberich's estimate is right or how much the added capacity will cost. The California Energy Commission, which has responsibility for licensing new power plants and forecasting future power demand, said it doesn't have the analytical tools necessary to know how much reserve power will be needed. "It is frankly in the development stage," said Mike Jaske, the commission's senior policy analyst for electricity supply.

#### **They link to their own technological determinism argument – they say passage of a solar policy leads to democratic discussion – this is a symptom of the same reductionism they criticize**

#### **Abstract defenses of public debate romanticize Western participatory democracy and ignore its role in the historical evolution of capitalism**

Chaput ‘4

(Catherine, PhD Student in Rhetoric @ Arizona, “Review of Carl Boggs's *The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere*”, *Workplace*, Issue 7, http://louisville.edu/journal/workplace/issue7/chaput.html)

12. While this book calls attention to the limited nature of many current political and cultural movements, it does so with more than a trace of nostalgia for the history of Western participatory democracy. Certainly Boggs is cognizant of the problems of constructing an overly nostalgic and romantic past. Indeed, he sees nostalgic trends as dangerously close to the isolationism he critiques in this text: he states that alienation from the public sphere "often gives rise not only to privatized retreat but to romanticized journeys into nostalgia" (37). While this knowledge fails to keep Boggs from falling victim to his own romanticized historical narrative, perhaps the most glaring omission from his text might have prevented this nostalgia. Boggs never mentions Jürgen Habermas nor his important text, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. According to Habermas, the term "public sphere" originated sometime in the eighteenth century as part of the emerging civil society of wage labor and commodity exchange. The public sphere, then, is a term historically embedded in the development of capitalism. Of course, the idea of the public, or the polis, has a much longer history dating back to the Greeks. However, since Boggs chose to interrogate the public sphere in decline because of capitalism, Habermas's argument that the public sphere acts in complicity with the needs of capitalism seems to be seriously under question in this text. The significantly different understanding of the public sphere that operates in this book deserves further attention, justification, and historical grounding. Contextualizing against Habermas seems the natural place to start.

Romanticizing Western democracy makes it dogmatic and leads to Eurocentric violence- attempts to export it which creates us/them exclusions – turns the case

Radhakrishnan ‘6

(R., Prof. of English & Comparative Lit @ UC-Irvine, “When Is Democracy Political?”, *boundary 2* 33:3 (2006))

Profound as Wolin’s symptomatic reading is, does he have an answer and a remedy? Is democracy redeemable from the megastate? Is the political redeemable from democratic citizenship? Are politics separable from the stranglehold of the nation-state? What, ultimately, is stultifying about Wolin’s analysis is the fact that his focus is inexorably on the West and on Western democracies.8 Even as he takes the American megastate to task for its ideologically crafted amnesia and its megastate-like behavior toward the rest of the world, he does not (1) problematize democracy and democratic citizenship as such, even if it had not been hijacked by a media-driven mega-state; (2) interrogate the axiomatics of the nationalist horizon that eventually accommodates all democratic flows and energies (I am reminded here of the hysterical manner in which Islamic Americans are attempting to prove that their Islam can be harmoniously subsumed by an overarching American identity); (3) factor into his critical reading the macropolitical valence of colonial modernity and its ongoing participation in a world structured in dominance (here I must say that Wolin remains a provincial American theorist); or (4) acknowledge the ideology that subtends his very quarrel with a democracy run amok, that is, a Western/Eurocentric ideology that refuses to learn anything at all from the non-West and insists that the only way to actualize a West–non-West relationship is by way of a modular export to the non-West of the nation form and a democratic process already canonized into its ideal manifestation in the West.9 As I conclude this essay, I would like to consider briefly some of Wolin’s prescriptions within the larger world- historical context of the West versus the Rest.10 In our own times, nationalism and the nation-state have been the most effective, rigorous, and ruthless gatekeepers of people and populism. One cannot be part of the Mexican people and claim peoplehood within the populism of the United States. Peoples of the world do not and cannot not unite, for the simple reason that there is no taxonomic space or rubric under which they can consolidate such a solidarity. ‘‘Your’’ people and ‘‘my’’ people can of course negotiate with one another, but only on the strict basis of what makes me ‘‘me,’’ and you ‘‘you.’’ Even within the space of the intranational, a declaration like ‘‘We are all American people’’ is constrained to work within the inequalities, the asymmetries, and the unevenness of the American condition at that particular juncture in history. By this logic, at a particular moment of history, slaves had to be slaves, and women had to be nonvoters, so that the American people could celebrate their populism. In other words, a nation can legitimately call itself democratic even when the demos it works with is exclusionary: racist, casteist, homophobic, Orientalist, ethnocentric. By this definition of democracy, a slaveholding nation and a casteist nation can call itself a democracy merely on the procedural claim that its government is based on the will of the people, that is, racist people, homophobic people, xenophobic people. There is nothing democracy can do, on the basis of its procedural rationale, to prevent, say, hate crimes. Democracy by definition remains incapable of any ideological intervention in the status quo. The play of democracy is a highly centered play with no authority to problematize its ideological nature. The reason for this constitutive and constitutional debacle of democracy is something more complex than what Wolin perceives in the context of American democracy: the unresolved tension between the Jeffersonian-Madisonian model and the Hamiltonian model of constitutional power. The deeper reason I submit is fourfold: (1) democracy as a pragmatic mode does not allow a Foucauldian genealogical inquiry into its own historicity; (2) democracy pretends to function as a postideological instrument of collective will and sovereignty; (3) even the most benign and inclusive practice of democracy still remains a mechanism that has to produce an ‘‘other’’ so that the demos can be realized as a form of the Us/Them;11 and (4) democracy remains a prisoner to the regime of representation and is therefore incapable of the rigorous skepticism that representation itself could be the ultimate form of epistemic violence.12 Based on this, I would ask Wolin the following questions: What kind of a place or topos is democracy? Is it a place or a nonplace, a homotopia or a heterotopia? Is democracy what is common and shareable among the nations of the world? Is democracy shareable because the national form has already been generalized as the only possible currency of collectivity? In the glocality of the global, where does democracy locate itself? Is its potential ubiquity initially local or global? Assuming that democracy is capable of radical self-reflexivity and autocritique in any one place understood territorially as a nation space, how would transformations in one place affect the goings- on in another location? What are the insides and outsides of any location, and who or what force does the gatekeeping?13 If, shall we say, a democratic revolution or a revolution of democracy does take place within the United States as a result of which the megastate is cut to size and even abandoned as the sovereign body of power, what would the implications be elsewhere? I ask this both as a political question driven by a concern for coeval- ness among different cultures, societies, and nations, and as a philosophical question regarding the Self-Other problematic.

Their evidence misunderstands apathy- it’s a moral response to powerlessness and government corruption- participation narratives reinforce a sense of national shame and collective guilt that only increases alienation- prefer our evidence because its based on fieldwork instead of psychological speculation

Greenberg ‘10

(Jessica, Assistant Prof. of Communications @ Northwestern, ““There’s Nothing Anyone Can Do About It”: Participation, Apathy, and “Successful” Democratic Transition in Postsocialist Serbia”, *Slavic Review* 69, no. 1 (Spring 2010)

But as the example of Mira shows, we need to ask what people, and young people in particular, are opting out of when they do not participate in politics. For many young Serbian men and women, politics is colored by a sense of the failure of their parents’ generation. Time and again I heard young people express the frustration that they suffered the consequences of violence, poverty, and isolation for which they were not responsible. The idea that political participation could be a regenerative site of moral-cultural possibility ran counter to many of these young people’s experiences. But more critically, the very possibility that politics might be efficacious, that it might reflect the will of the people, ran the risk of implicating the nation in questions of collective guilt and national shame. Those who see a direct link between democratic participation and moral transformation fail to grasp the complexity of this relationship. This dynamic might well be instructive in other newly democratic contexts, especially where politics is understood to be corrupting and dirty. For example, in his study of university students’ relationship to nationalist discourse in Romania, Jon Fox shows that apathy helps students distance themselves from what they perceive to be a corrupting sphere of politics. Labeling politics “corrupt,” “dirty,” and “putrid,” students used “indifference and scorn — and sometimes humor and irony —[to] absolve themselves of complicity with the dirty business of politics.”74 Not surprisingly, Fox’s interlocutors expressed apathy through a moral register that revealed more complex social meanings than simple disinterest. Fox argues that these “students’ self-professed apathy was not the mere absence of interest in politics; it was at the same time a practical accomplishment, a set of stances that required work to both produce and uphold.”75 Thus it is important to take the complexity and moral significance of nonparticipation, disinterest, and apathy seriously. Mira and many of her generation who have retreated from political engagement struggle to be democratic citizens and to avoid the messy pitfalls, moral compromises, or sense of powerlessness that can accompany political engagement. Indeed, they struggle with a central question in Serbian politics: how to be a Serbian citizen, a democratic participant, and a moral subject. This generation seems caught in the whirlwind of hope and despair, possibility and frustration that characterizes political life and social worlds in contemporary Serbia. Nonparticipation is a practice that condenses overlapping and contradictory networks of meaning and history. By making this argument I do not discount historical and institutional legacies of socialism in con- temporary political practice. The experience of the socialist past has a significant impact on how people frame, understand, and imagine politics in postsocialist contexts. Indeed, as many anthropologists have shown, expectations about state-citizen relations, regimes of ownership and property, labor practices, and the moral pitfalls of economic and social survival continue to shape postsocialist lifeworlds.76 But I believe that not enough attention has been paid to the role that democratic policy and discourse as specific forms of power have in how people understand themselves as specifically postsocialist citizens, successful or failed democratic subjects, Serbians or Europeans. In asking these questions, scholars and policymakers may find more meaningful ways to open up democratic possibilities than circulating and recirculating moralizing narratives of politics and progress, which may alienate more than inspire. Indeed, researchers and practitioners can also interrogate their own roles in creating and deploying frameworks for successful and failed democracy. Such frameworks, and the moral, cultural, and political forms of judgment they convey, are part and parcel of how democracy comes to be meaningful in the post-socialist world and beyond.

#### Natural gas is terrible for the environment

Howarth et al. 2011- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Cornell University (March 13, Robert W., Renee Santoro, and Anthony Ingraffea, “Methane and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale formations A letter ”http://gdacc.org/2011/04/15/methane-and-the-greenhouse-gas-footprint-of-natural-gas-from-shale-formations/)

Considering the 20-year horizon, the GHG footprint for shale gas is at least 20% greater than and perhaps more than twice as great as that for coal when expressed per quantity of energy available during combustion (Fig. 1a; see Electronic Supplemental Materials for derivation of the estimates for diesel oil and coal). Over the 100-year frame, the GHG footprint is comparable to that for coal: the low-end shale-gas emissions are 18% lower than deep-mined coal, and the high-end shale-gas emissions are 15% greater than surface-mined coal emissions (Fig. 1b). For the 20 year horizon, the GHG footprint of shale gas is at least 50% greater than for oil, and perhaps 2.5- times greater. At the 100-year time scale, the footprint for shale gas is similar to or 35% greater than for oil. We know of no other estimates for the GHG footprint of shale gas in the peerreviewed literature. However, we can compare our estimates for conventional gas with three previous peer-reviewed studies on the GHG emissions of conventional natural gas and coal: Hayhoe et al. (2002), Lelieveld et al. (2005), and Jamarillo et al. (2007). All concluded that GHG emissions for conventional gas are less than for coal, when considering the contribution of methane over 100 years. In contrast, our analysis indicates that conventional gas has little or no advantage over coal even over the 100-year time period (Fig. 1b). Our estimates for conventional-gas methane emissions are in the range of those in Hayhoe et al. (2002) but are higher than those in Lelieveld et al. (2005) and Jamarillo et al. (2007) who used 1996 EPA emission factors now known to be too low (EPA 2010). To evaluate the effect of methane, all three of these studies also used global warming potentials now believed to be too low (Shindell et al. 2009). Still, Hayhoe et al. (2002) concluded that under many of the scenarios evaluated, a switch from coal to conventional natural gas could aggravate global warming on time scales of up to several decades.

Even with the lower global warming potential value, Lelieveld et al. (2005) concluded that natural gas has a greater GHG footprint than oil if methane emissions exceeded 3.1% and worse than coal if the emissions exceeded 5.6% on the 20-year time scale. They used a methane global warming potential value for methane from IPCC (1995) that is only 57% of the new value from Shindell et al. (2009), suggesting that in fact methane emissions of only 2% to 3% make the GHG footprint of conventional gas worse than oil and coal. Our estimates for fugitive shale-gas emissions are 3.6 to 7.9%. Our analysis does not consider the efficiency of final use. If fuels are used to generate electricity, natural gas gains some advantage over coal because of greater efficiencies of generation (see Electronic Supplemental Materials). However, this does not greatly affect our overall conclusion: the GHG footprint of shale gas approaches or exceeds coal even when used to generate electricity (Table in Electronic Supplemental Materials). Further, shale-gas is promoted for other uses, including as a heating and transportation fuel, where there is little evidence that efficiencies are superior to diesel oil.

#### Global ecosystems are on the brink of collapse – we are reaching the “tipping point” of environmental degradation

Knight, ’10

[Matthew, Cites the GBO and CBD: The GBO-3 is a landmark study in what is the U.N.'s International Year of Biodiversity and will play a key role in guiding the negotiations between world governments at the U.N. Biodiversity Summit in Nagoya, Japan in October 2010. The CBD -- an international treaty designed to sustain diversity of life on Earth -- was set up at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, May 10, “U.N. report: Eco-systems at 'tipping point'”, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/05/10/biodiversity.loss.report/index.html?eref=igoogle\_cnn]

The world's eco-systems are at risk of "rapid degradation and collapse" according to a new United Nations report. The third Global Biodiversity Outlook (GBO-3) published by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) warns that unless "swift, radical and creative action" is taken "massive further loss is increasingly likely." Ahmed Djoghlaf, executive secretary of the CBD said in a statement: "The news is not good. We continue to lose biodiversity at a rate never before seen in history." The U.N. warns several eco-systems including the Amazon rainforest, freshwater lakes and rivers and coral reefs are approaching a "tipping point" which, if reached, may see them never recover. The report says that no government has completely met biodiversity targets that were first set out in 2002 -- the year of the first GBO report. Executive Director of the U.N. Environmental Program Achim Steiner said there were key economic reasons why governments had failed in this task. "Many economies remain blind to the huge value of the diversity of animals, plants and other life-forms and their role in healthy and functioning eco-systems," Steiner said in a statement. Although many countries are beginning to factor in "natural capital," Steiner said that this needs "rapid and sustained scaling-up." Despite increases in the size of protected land and coastal areas, biodiversity trends reported in the GBO-3 are almost entirely negative. Vertebrate species fell by nearly one third between 1970 and 2006, natural habitats are in decline, genetic diversity of crops is falling and sixty breeds of livestock have become extinct since 2000. Nick Nuttall, a U.N. Environmental Program spokesman, said the cost of eco-systems degradation is huge. "In terms of land-use change, it's thought that the annual financial loss of services eco-systems provide -- water, storing carbon and soil stabilization -- is about &euro50 billion ($64 billion) a year," Nuttall told CNN. "If this continues we may well see by 2050 a cumulative loss of what you might call land-based natural capital of around &euro95 trillion ($121 trillion)," he said.

# 2NC

### Impact

#### Excessive consumption makes extinction inevitable- social and environmental factors build positive feedbacks create a cascade of destruction - only social reorganization away from consumption can save the planet

Ehrenfeld ‘5,

(David, Dept. of Ecology, Evolution, and Natural Resources @ Rutgers University, “The Environmental Limits to Globalization”, *Conservation Biology* Vol. 19 No. 2 April 2005)

The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The principal environmental side effects of globalization—climate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)—are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book *The Arrogance of Humanism* (1981), I claimed that our ability to manage global systems, which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesn’t work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book *Normal Accidents*, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of today’s complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the system’s processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmental—events that we cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said, “There is nothing in today’s global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic development within and between the world’s diverse societies.” The result, Gray states, is that “The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social institutions” has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise, considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people.... It is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same thing in 1995: “The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime.” How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the non- human residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these recoveries are unusual—rare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few ecological systems may survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book *The Collapse of Complex Societies,* the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom line—concern for its condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilization’s very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here ( Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities. But such needed developments will not be sufficient—or may not even occur— without corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelated—any attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in easing the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b). If such integrated change occurs in time, it will likely happen partly by our own design and partly as an unplanned response to the constraints imposed by social unrest, disease, and the economics of scarcity. With respect to the planned component of change, we are facing, as eloquently described by Rees (2002), “the ultimate challenge to human intelligence and self-awareness, those vital qualities we humans claim as uniquely our own. *Homo sapiens* will either. . .become fully human or wink out ignominiously, a guttering candle in a violent storm of our own making.” If change does not come quickly, our global civilization will join Tainter’s (1988) list as the latest and most dramatic example of collapsed complex societies. Is there anything that could slow globalization quickly, before it collapses disastrously of its own environmental and social weight? It is still not too late to curtail the use of energy, reinvigorate local and regional communities while restoring a culture of concern for each other, reduce nonessential global trade and especially global finance (Daly & Cobb 1989), do more to control introductions of exotic species (including pathogens), and accelerate the growth of sustainable agriculture. Many of the needed technologies are already in place. It is true that some of the damage to our environment—species extinctions, loss of crop and domestic animal varieties, many exotic species introductions, and some climatic change— will be beyond repair. Nevertheless, the opportunity to help our society move past globalization in an orderly way, while there is time, is worth our most creative and passionate efforts. The citizens of the United States and other nations have to understand that our global economic system has placed both our environment and our society in peril, a peril as great as that posed by any war of the twentieth century. This understanding, and the actions that follow, must come not only from enlightened leadership, but also from grassroots consciousness raising. It is still possible to reclaim the planet from a self-destructive economic system that is bringing us all down together, and this can be a task that bridges the divide between conservatives and liberals. The crisis is here, now. What we have to do has become obvious. Globalization can be scaled back to manageable proportions only in the context of an altered world view that rejects materialism even as it restores a sense of communal obligation. In this way, alone, can we achieve real homeland security, not just in the United States, but also in other nations, whose fates have become so thoroughly entwined with ours within the global environment we share.

### Sustainable Development/Recycling Link

#### **The ambiguity of sustainable development de-politicizes consumption and directs attention towards technology – only directly challenging consumption produces effective politics**

Princen et al 2

(Thomas, Professor at the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of Michigan, Ken Conca, Associate Professor of Government and Politics and Director of the Harrison Program on the Future Global Agenda at the University of Maryland, Michael Maniates, Professor of Environmental Science and Political Science Allegheny College, Confronting Consumption, pgs. 1-2)

Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that comforting terms like sustainable development have come to frame the dominant environmental discourse in North America, where the contributors to this volume live and work. Those who developed the term—a concept that suffused the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and, to this day, reverberates powerfully through the environmental debate—defined sustainable practice as actions that meet the needs of current populations without endangering the prospects and livelihoods of future generations.1 Just what constitutes the needs of today’s people remains blurred, out of focus, even usefully ambiguous: everyone has become adept at talking about sustainability without having to wade into the treacherous waters of consumption. Consequently, much that is said today in the name of sustainability continues to stress the familiar environmental themes of population (too large), technology (not green enough), and economic growth (not enough of it in the right places). Consumption occasionally enters the discussion, but only in nonthreatening ways, and most often in the form of calls for ‘‘green consumption’’ or in support of some moral imperative to consume recycled or recyclable products. Much of this sustainable development talk steers clear of escalating consumption levels and, especially, the roots of such escalation. In the United States, for example, conventional wisdom casts recycling as a primary mechanism for mass publics to ‘‘save the planet’’ without confronting the hard truth that recycling can be a reward for ever-increasing consumption. Questions about driving forces and the impact of consumption continue to hang there, unaddressed. They are like the proverbial 800-pound gorilla in the living room that almost everyone chooses to ignore.

### Alt Overview for Counterfactuals

#### **1970s oil scarcity triggered public anger and created backlash towards the government – this anger was rooted in a belief in oil as part of a sacred “American way of life” – interrogating this anger and the discourse of oil entitlement that accompanied it is a better point of departure for public debate because it attacks the roots of historical obsession with consumption**

Huber ‘11

(Matt, Department of Geography, Syracuse University, “Shocked: “Energy Crisis” and Neoliberal Transformation in the 1970s”, globetrotter.berkeley.edu/bwep/colloquium/papers/Huber\_Shocked.pdf)

Thus, in 1972 it appeared the US had reached its geological limits. Of course, it was during the same year, that the Club of Rome issued its now infamous The Limits to Growth which undergirded a decade fixated upon scarcity and the exhaustibility of nonrenewable resources (like fossil fuels) upon which modern industrial capitalism depends.42 A 1974 Op-Ed in the New York Times titled “An Age of Scarcity,” problematizing abundance as only a “modern idea.” More than other commodities, the scarcity of oil – with its pervasive embeddedness in all forms of everyday practice – signaled a larger crisis. While there were shortages of many commodities in the 1970s, one editorial states, “Not wheat, nor newsprint, nor beef came close to discommoding as many Americans as do gas and oil.”43 As early as 1972, an Editorial decaled, “the energy crisis...threatens the American way of life, at least that life that means color television, frostless freezer, self-cleaning ovens, and electric grills, knives, combs and toothbrushes.”44 The centrality of energy powering a whole set automatic machineries and social reproductive practices was suddenly problematized. The multiplicity of petroleum products provided the materiality underneath an individualized vision of control over the stuff of life – space, the home, the body – but, the 1970s witnessed innumerable events that put this control over life into question. The imaginary of finite fossil fuels was also rooted in a corresponding discourse of energy nationalism which produced anxiety over increasing reliance on energy not found within the territorial boundaries of the U.S. nation-state. Thus, alongside oil’s exhaustibility, the geopolitics of oil is also profoundly shaped by the uneven geography of deposits. Foreign Oil and the Territoriality of Dependence One of the most basic geographical problems with petroleum (and other mineral resources) is that deposits are unevenly distributed and materially fixed in space. During the postwar period, the scalar contradictions of petroleum governance in the United States were worked out to construct what could be called a Fordist national oil regime wherein mass oil consumption was largely provisioned by domestic production. It is fashionable to trace US dependence upon foreign oil to 1945 when Franklin Roosevelt had his famous meeting with Saudi King Saud on an American warship along the Suez Canal.45 But, this meeting was not about securing Saudi Arabian oil for American consumers, but rather for US oil capital. With its Americanized enclaves, US oil companies exploited domestic and migrant workers in the Saudi oil fields to mainly export oil to Europe and Japan; not the United States. 46 Foreign oil was seen as a problem long before the 1970s, but the concern was mainly articulated by a coalition of independent high-cost domestic oil producers.47 With clear memories of the crisis in East Texas, these producers feared that prices would collapse if cheap foreign oil was allowed to flood the domestic market. Precisely because of the actions by state prorationing agencies to restrict output and keep prices high, oil produced from Venezuela to the Middle East was considerably cheaper to produce. Although estimates varied, Prindle suggests that in 1960 an average barrel of crude in the Middle East cost $.20 to produce, while the US level averaged $1.75 (a number that may itself be reflective of proration policies).48 Thus, until the 1970s, “foreign oil” – especially the massive reserves in the Middle East – was constructed as a grave, but narrow and sectoral, threat to the domestic US oil petroleum industry. International Companies – and even independent refiners – always had a strong incentive to import this cheap oil and capture markets within the high priced markets of the United States. The contradictory tendencies of this arrangement revealed themselves very early on in the 1950s. Table 1 shows the level of imports and the percentage of imports quenching demand throughout much of the postwar period. The slow and steady increase in imports both in raw numbers and as a percentage of demand was considerable. The pace, however, could have been considerably greater had not the Eisenhower Administration installed the mandatory import quota program that remained in effect between 1959 and 1973. This program putatively attempted to fix the level of crude imports at 12.2 percent of domestic demand, but a complicated set of exemptions by refineries and geography ensured that the level was higher than that. Nevertheless, Bohi and Russell estimate that if the program were not instituted imports would have constituted 61% of domestic consumption in 1970.49 The program served to mollify the contradictory tendencies inherent within the entire system of prorationing – namely, the maintenance of national high cost producers in the face of a global geography of low-cost production.50 Only in the 1970s did the concept of “foreign oil” begin to become problematized not from the perspective of oil producers, but oil consumers. Americans were not worried about foreign sources of coffee, bananas, or, increasingly, manufactured consumer goods, but oil’s saturation of social reproduction and centrality to ideas of life, home, freedom, and mobility made dependence upon foreign oil seem unduly precarious. Ever since, leaders have continued to promise the territorial trap of an energy system contained within American borders in the name of “energy independence.” Richard Nixon’s first major speech after the OPEC embargo initiated a new “Project Independence” which unrealistically promised American independence from foreign oil by 1980. Moreover, oil’s fixity in space (and declining reserves within the US territory) created increasing geostrategic discourses where access to oil for the reproduction of American life was equated with national security, or what was eventually termed “energy security.”53 Amongst politicians and intellectuals, the oil crisis was represented as a great geopolitical confrontation between the United States and Europe and the rising power of OPEC and oil producing countries. The effective use by OPEC of what was called the “oil weapon” seemed to reverse the many centuries of Euro-American global domination.54 It was the mere assertion of power by non-Western countries that was seen as so shocking and unacceptable. On a more popular level, the politics of oil were shot through with a racialized politics of anti-Arab xenophobia. Countless political cartoons saturated American newspapers with highly caricatured images of obese Arab oil men (and they were always men) cynically plotting their next draconian imposition of pain on American consumers. This racialized politics circulated founds its purchase in popular culture through anger over US exports to these very nations. By the second oil shock of 1979, country music star, Bobby Butler, released “Cheaper crude or no more food” which echoed a longstanding sentiment that the US fed the world and thus could cut off food supplies as retribution. One letter to Nixon’s energy czar in 1973 presciently summed up the song’s message, “Tell the Arabs, ‘You drink your oil and we’ll eat our grain.”55 As I will detail later, the primary objection emerging from popular discourse was that Arab nations were unfairly intervening within the marketplace. Yet, for most Americans, the energy crisis was less about geopolitical confrontation and foreign policy, and more about the “shock” of gasoline lines and limits to everyday geographies of social reproduction combined with spiraling inflation, or what was called “the rising cost of living”. Freedom on Fumes: Gasoline Lines and the Geography of Limits During the winter of 1973-1974, and again in the summer of 1979, consumers witnessed winding lines at gasoline pumps in different parts of the country, limits on how much gasoline could be purchased, and outbursts of violence between and among consumers and gas station attendants. One attendant in Bradenton, FL was killed by being crushed between two cars when an eager driver propelled the car in front of him forward into the victim.56 In Pennsylvania, Bruce Hibbs obtained a 12-gauge shotgun joining “a number of operators who are toting guns to protect themselves.”57 Theft from gas stations and automobiles themselves was not uncommon. No longer taken for granted, access to gasoline appeared as a Hobbesian “war of all against all.” The geopolitical narrative of dependence and insecurity translated well to the everyday struggle for gasoline. Just as the OPEC embargo was represented as a lack of US control over distant spaces, the gasoline shortage was characterized by a sudden and dramatic limitation to the privatized command over space central the postwar vision of entrepreneurial life. For many short on gasoline, the most pressing concern was how to traverse the new suburban geography marked by vast spaces between home and work. This new geography made private automobile commuting the only option, and, therefore, the sudden lack of gasoline was framed as an unjust threat to livelihood. As one writer from the infamously suburban Southern California put it to President Nixon’s Energy Office, “Many thousands of us have no public transportation to get to our jobs and rely on our cars. I have to travel 70 miles a day round trip to work and no bus could get me there. I must drive, and soon I’ll be unable to buy gas or afford it. This isn’t right!”58

#### Consumption analysis wipes the policy slate clean and creates a new relationship between humans and the environment – forces individuals to take responsibility for their economic behavior and motivates ecological micropolitics

Princen 2

(Thomas Princen, Associate Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy in the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of Michigan, where he also co-directs the Workshop on Consumption and Environment, 02, "The Consumption Angle," Confronting Consumption, p. 41-2)

By making consumption more visible analytically, certain activities become more prominent. From a production angle, the simple-living movement, home power, and local currencies (part III) are trivial instances of protest; they are of little political or economic consequence. From a consumption angle, however, they are concrete expressions of concern and resistance. They represent a Sense that too much of what is important in day-to-day life is lost through the lens of ever-more production meeting the (presumably) insatiable desires of people as consumers. These cases not only give meaning to consumption, but they give meaning to economic activity as being more than that which ascribes value only to what is produced and sold in the open market and that assigns people the role of consumer, not producer and certainly not citizen. If simple living, home power, and local currencies are trivial by conventional (read, production) measures, they are not trivial representations of the widespread discontent with consumerist society. In short, the consumption angle is a means of "rethinking how humans relate to nature." It is a way to, in effect, wipe the slate clean with respect to how analysts, policymakers, and citizens understand social organization for resource use. It puts aside, or goes back to the origins of, the neoclassical economic model and asks what model would have been most useful given ecological constraint, given the lack of unending frontiers and infinite waste sinks, and given the inability to find a technical substitute for everything from petroleum to the ozone layer. The consumption angle not only allows for consideration of "full-world," ecologically constrained conditions, but places ecosystem functioning up front and central. It does so by generating questions that ask what is consumed, what is put at risk, what is lost. And it does so without restricting the questions to consumer products or even industrial inputs but by going all the way back up the decision chain to organisms and ecosystems and biochemical processes. It also does so by drawing attention to behaviors and movements that otherwise tend to escape those who hold the production angle sacrosanct: restraint and resistance with respect to ever-increasing demand, simple living, home power, and local currencies with respect to lifestyle and economic life. Finally, the consumption angle lends itself to explicit assignment of responsibility for excess throughput. This stands in marked contrast to the production angle, where actors routinely escape responsibility via distanced commerce and the black box of consumer sovereignty.

### AT Perm/Link Turn

Alt must come first – the aff’s increase in energy efficiency produces increases in consumption, only first changing consumption patterns can avoid ecological collapse

Dardozzi 8

(Jeff, co-founder of The Earth Alchemists and is a designer/builder of living structure for the un-plasticized, “The Specter of Jevons' Paradox”, Synthesis/Regeneration 47 (Fall 2008))

In the early eighties, an old debate within economics resurfaced surrounding something called Jevons' Paradox, or the more descriptive term rebound effect. Many well-known minds, such as Amory Lovins, piped in on the new meaning of this old, obscure argument buried in 19th century classical economics. First coined by the economist W. Stanley Jevons in The Coal Question (1865), the paradox he noted was in regards to coal consumption and efficiency improvements in steam engines: "It is a confusion of ideas to suppose that economical use of fuel is equivalent to diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth." In the 1980s, Jevons' observation was revisited by the economists Daniel Khazzoom and Leonard Brookes. In their analysis, they looked beyond the relationship between energy resources and the machines that convert them to useful work to consider the overall effect of technological improvements in resource efficiencies on the energy use of a society as a whole. They argued that increased efficiency paradoxically leads to increased overall energy consumption. In 1992, the economist Harry Saunders dubbed this hypothesis the Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate and showed that it was true under neo-classical growth theory over a wide range of assumptions. Since the appearance of the Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate, numerous studies have weighed in on the debate arguing a range of impacts of the rebound effect. In January 2008, Earthscan released Jevons Paradox: The Myth of Resource Efficiency Improvements as the latest and most comprehensive review of the paradox in economics literature. Prefaced by anthropologist Joseph Tainter (The Collapse of Complex Societies, 1988), the book reviews the history of the debate, current findings and includes the latest multi-disciplinary studies regarding the existence of the rebound effect. The book clearly supports the proposition that the rebound effect is present in the US, Europe and most other economies and that strategies to increase energy efficiency in themselves will do little to improve the energy or the ecological situation. In fact, they may well worsen it as the historical impact of resource efficiency improvements shows that increasing the efficiency in the use of a resource in turn increases the consumption of that resource.

#### Sequencing DA – centering consumption as a subject of ethical concern is a pre-requisite to the aff – their “production-focused” change to energy policy only marginalizes consumption practices by treating them as a given outside of politics

Alexander ‘11

(Samuel, University of Melbourne; Office for Environmental Programs/Simplicity Institute, “

Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence”, Social Sciences Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1941087)

For present purposes, the third and final point about how neoclassicism marginalizes consumption concerns the way in which any problems caused by market activity are always approached from the ‘production angle,’ never the ‘consumption angle.’70 The reasoning is as follows. Despite the first two ways in which neoclassicists conceptualize consumption as unquestionably good, no one, not even neoclassicists, can deny that market activity is causing, and has always caused, some real problems. Think, for example, of the many ecological crises we are facing today, such as climate change, the mass extinction of species, pollution, deforestation, the depletion of the ocean’s fisheries, soil erosion, etc. One might have thought that these crises would have prompted neoclassicists to finally rethink their uncritical attitudes toward consumption, to finally acknowledge that, perhaps, consumption is not unquestionably good. But this has proven to be a false hope, and perhaps this should have come as no surprise. Neoclassicism, after all, is a grand, totalizing meta‐narrative, which claims to have an answer to all criticisms, such that all and any of the problems caused by market activity have a purported solution within the free market system and without needing to rethink or revise any of the neoclassical assumptions (including the assumptions about consumption). If there is a problem caused by market activity, neoclassicists argue, this simply indicates that there has been what is called a ‘market failure,’ which typically means that the costs of production have somehow been externalized, leading to artificially cheap commodities which, in turn, leads to the overconsumption of such commodities. But the neoclassical solution to such overconsumption does not require questioning consumption in any way. Consumption, as we have seen, is sacrosanct! Rather, the solution to such market failures is simply to attempt to internalize all externalities from the production angle – that is, to try to find ways to make sure that the costs of production reflect the ‘true’ costs (i.e. the costs all things considered). Once this has been achieved – if it can be achieved – any consumption that takes place is once again assumed to be at an ‘optimal’ level, which is to say, at a level that maximizes overall utility. In this way, neoclassicism manages to retain perfect faith in the virtue of consumption. We might conclude, therefore, consciously or unconsciously, that since consumption is a virtue, it need not be a subject of ethical concern. Acts of consumption are beyond ethics, or, as neoclassicists put it, such acts are simply ‘given.’ The point of all this has been to suggest that the paradigm of neoclassical economics may be responsible, and surely is responsible, for why consumption has been marginalized as a subject of ethical concern within market societies and beyond. And given the essentially hegemonic role neoclassical economics plays in the world today – manifesting in the globalized political sphere as ‘neoliberalism’71 or ‘Empire’72 – perhaps it should come as no surprise to discover that all of us may have internalized its precepts to some degree. That is, even those who have never studied or even heard of neoclassical economics – indeed, even those who dedicate considerable amounts of time to criticizing the ideology! – may still have imbibed some of its reasoning simply by virtue of living in a world that is so fundamentally shaped by it. We are, after all, social constructs, and, as explained earlier, our perception of the world and of ourselves is a function of the paradigm of understanding that we bring to experience and that we use to make sense of the world. We do not get to choose which paradigm we think with, however, since the act of choosing would be an act of thinking, and in order to think in the first place a paradigm of understanding already has to be in place. As Martin Heidegger once asserted, somewhat cryptically, ‘language speaks man,’73 by which he meant, we can suppose, that our notions of ‘self’ are not independent of language but a function of it. Donald Davidson made a similar point, but more clearly, when he wrote that ‘there is no chance that someone can take up a vantage point for comparing conceptual schemes by temporarily shedding his own.’74 We must begin, that is, from where we are, with whom we are, rebuilding the boat of understanding one plank at a time, without ever being able to begin again from scratch. If neoclassical economics has been internalized to some extent, consciously or unconsciously – in particular, if one has internalized the neoclassical understanding of consumption as unquestionably good – this means that the first step in any ethics of consumption might involve engaging the self by the self for the purpose of centering consumption; that is, for the purpose of deliberately bringing consumption into focus as a subject of ethical concern. Every conceptual framework conceals as it reveals, and whatever enlightenment one might gain from neoclassical economics, it must be acknowledged that its impressive edifice also casts shadows. Consumption, for reasons just explained, lies in the dark. An ethics of consumption must begin, therefore, by casting light in its direction, and this can only be achieved by deliberately giving the subject increased attention. Obviously, if one does not look for, or cannot see, a subject of ethical concern, it will not be a subject of ethical concern. However, even when the possibility of dedicating increased attention to consumption has been raised, which is perhaps the most difficult step, there is a second step, and that is to actually maintain the attention. The third step is to determine how, exactly, and in what ways, one could engage the self by the self with respect to consumption (an endeavor that is taken up in the next two sections). Notice, here, that the terrain of ethical activity lies within the self, at least at first, rather than being external to it. Someone who is cognizant of the three consumption-­‐ related problems outlined above – ecological degradation, poverty amidst plenty, and consumer malaise – might initially think that living in opposition to those problems must require, say, attending rallies, campaigning for political reform, engaging in civil disobedience, volunteering, engaging with and trying to mobilize the community, etc. These are surely all important things, but if our minds are not in order, then it may be that we end up directing our time and energies to pointless or even counter‐productive activity. One thinks here of the young Alcibiades, who wanted to leap into a political career, but who was ultimately persuaded by Socrates that, before he tried to take care of and assume control over others, he should first make sure he had taken care of and was in control of himself.75 Otherwise, even the best intentions might go astray. Socrates was to reproach Alcibiades for being so presumptuous: ‘you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do.’76 Importantly, however, Socrates was not assuming the role of advisor on the basis that he knew more than Alcibiades; rather, in typical fashion, Socrates assumed his role on the basis that he better understood the limits of knowledge; better understood that if he knew anything, it was that he knew not. In other words, Socrates knew better than any other that human understanding always has blind spots. The analysis above was intended to suggest that consumption might be one such blind spot.

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### 2NC Consumption Framework

#### The aff’s calls for pragmatism and specificity are a farce – their change in energy strategy represents conscious adoption of larger institutional logics, not an incremental change in existing policy – only radical analysis of the energy system takes the aff’s change seriously and avoids error replication

Byrne & Toly 6

(Josh, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy and distinguished professor of energy and climate policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Politics & International Relations, Director of Urban Studies Program at Wheaton, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, pgs. 1-32 in Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict, eds. Josh Byrne, Noah Toly, and Leigh Glover)

When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy discourse appears impoverished. Many of its leading voices proclaim great things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some participants may petition for a progressive middle ground, acknowledging that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but it hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy and politics is the reasonable social response. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals, that hardly envision incremental consequences, would indulge a form of selfdeception rather than represent a serious discursive position. An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).

### 2nc Overview

#### Solar tech is uniquely environmentally destructive – rare earth mineral extraction alone produces massive chemical pollution, warming, soil erosion, and watershed contamination

Downey, Barnes & Clark 10

(Liam, is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Colorado at Boulder, Eric, is a doctoral student at the University of Colorado at Boulder, Katherine, graduate student in environmental studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder, “Natural Resource Extraction, Armed Violence, and Environmental Degradation”, Organ Environ, 2010 December; 23(4): 417–445, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3169238/)

The social, political, and economic importance of efficiently extracting and safely transporting natural resources cannot be underestimated. State, military, and geopolitical power, capital accumulation, social stability, industrial production, and the legitimacy of the state and economy all depend on large, increasing, and ever more concentrated withdrawals of natural resources from the earth (Bunker & Ciccantell, 2005; Gould, Pellow, & Schnaiberg, 2004, 2008; Klare, 2001, 2004; O’Connor, 1996; Schnaiberg & Gould, 2000). Moreover, because natural resources are the ultimate source of all the energy and goods we produce, consume, and throw away, natural resource extraction harms the environment not only at the “point of extraction” but globally as well. Thus, the grave environmental problems associated with industrial production and consumption (in both capitalist and noncapitalist societies) would not exist, or would not exist in their current form, if industrial societies were unable to efficiently extract and safely transport vast quantities of natural resources. Computer production, for example, could not occur without the extraction of minerals, fossil fuels, and other natural resources from around the world. One such category of resources is rare earth minerals, which are mined primarily in China (NRC, 2008). The mining of rare earth minerals produces as much as 2,000 tons of solid waste, including toxic heavy metals and radioactive thorium, for every ton of rare earth mineral produced (Farago, 2009; Rong & Yu, 2009). In China, it also results in topsoil loss, erosion, and widespread silting and contamination of rivers and reservoirs used for drinking and irrigation (Xu & Liu, 1999).2 Computers also harm the environment during the production, assembly, consumer use, shipping, disposal, and recycling stages of their lives and thus affect the environment and human health around the world. Environmental impacts during these stages of a computer’s life include abiotic depletion, global warming, the release of toxins into the environment, human exposure to highly toxic materials, acidification, ozone depletion, the formation of photoxidants, and water eutrophication (Choi, Shin, Lee, & Hur, 2006). Because computing power is so critical to globalization and economic growth, computer use also helps foster environmental problems associated with these phenomena. It would be difficult to argue, therefore, that the environmental problems associated with computer use and production are confined solely to the resource extraction stage of the commodity chain or that the environmental problems associated with the remaining stages of a computer’s life would exist without the extraction of the minerals, fuels, and other natural resources needed to produce, ship, use, recycle, and dispose of computers. This is true, of course, of all the products we use and produce, including weapons systems, automobiles, solar panels, and cell phones. Thus, resource extraction is a pivotal link in the chain connecting human activity and social organization to environmental degradation.

#### You should privilege everyday violence for two reasons- A) social bias underrepresents its effects B) its effects are exponential, not linear which means even if the only causes a small amount of structural violence, its terminal impacts are huge

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.